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CHARLES MALIK ON DIPLOMACY

A WRITING BY

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DIPLOMACY. Diplomacy is a genus of which there are many species. Generically, diplomacy is the act of intercourse between independent and free rational entities with a view to the establishment or enhancement of some predetermined end agreed upon between them.
The terms “free and independent” mean that the rational entities are distinct, that neither is subordinate to the other, that there is therefore an ultimate equality of status between them (expressed in the Charter of the United Nations by the term “sovereign equality”), and that each is an independent source of energy and will of its own. Nor can diplomacy set in except when the rational entities are brought together in some mode of community so as to pursue actively a certain common end. This is spoken of as a “common interest.” In all species of diplomacy the elements of freedom, independence, rationality, mutual respect, equality, and the presence of some end in view that is at least fully understood by the two parties, if not wholly agreed upon between them, are clearly operative. When any of these six elements is wanting, there simply is no possibility of diplomacy: there is only either dictation of will or groping in the dark.

This article examines only one species of diplomacy-the act of intercourse between free and independent nations. That one sometimes may speak with clear meaning of a husband being diplomatic with his wife, or a friend with his friend, or the representative of a corporation in negotiating an agreement with the representative of another, demonstrates that diplomacy deals with a more original stratum of human behaviour than intercourse between nations; the generic definition is justified as bringing out the essence of this deeper stratum. War or conflict would itself be a form of diplomacy. That is the view of Karl von Clausewitz, who declared that “war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse with the admixture of different means,” and that “the art of war in its highest point of view is policy, but, no doubt, a policy which fights battles, instead of writing notes.” The warring parties have at least one common end in view-that the existing situation between them is unsatisfactory and must be changed. War or violent conflict is a limiting case of the act of diplomacy; it is a radical mode of the diplomatic act; it is the pursuit of diplomacy by nonpeaceful means.

Three further narrowings of scope are necessary. As war is only a limiting case of diplomacy, and as normal diplomacy is peaceful diplomacy, this article covers only the latter. This is the persuasive act of negotiation among equals, in some clearly definable sense of the word “equal.” That is why diplomacy is often described as the art of negotiating- *l’art de negocier*. Second, international diplomacy could mean either the formulation of foreign policy by the independent sovereign himself or the actual conduct of the sovereign’s representatives in implementing a policy. This article concerns only the second sense of the term-diplomacy understood as the act of peaceful intercourse through their representatives between sovereign and independent nations. The third restriction of scope is from the matter of this act to its form. To study the content of the diplomatic activity is an endless task inseparable from the detailed study of the matter of concrete negotiations and specific relations between particular governments. All this falls under diplomatic history considered as to its content and not as to its form. This article covers only the rules and forms of the diplomatic act, abstracting from its content. There are intelligible norms, procedures, conventions, usages, reciprocities, structures, and methods that have governed the intercourse of nations throughout history, and it is these forms that are considered here. Wars, or the sovereign determination of policy, or the material content of particular negotiations are alluded to here only to illustrate or illuminate the fundamental theme-the form of the diplomatic act itself. The origin of the word "diplomacy" is the Greek diploun, "to double," "to bend double," from which came the term diploma, meaning an official document or charter, folded in a certain way, by which a prince confers a privilege. A diplomat, then, is simply the official who carries and transmits such a diploma, and diplomacy the function or act of that official.

FUNCTIONS

Extent of the Diplomat's Responsibilities.-The ambassador at his post in some capital is head of his diplomatic mission. He essentially mediates between his country or government and the country or government to which he is accredited. This mediating function comprises ten distinct areas of action or concern. (The account here may be compared with the five points under art. 3 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations [1961], concerning the functions of a diplomatic mission).

1. Principally, the ambassador represents his government before the government near which he resides. He transmits and, when necessary, he argues and defends his government's policy and position. Assuming he possesses a modicum of competence as a diplomat, his success or failure in this task of arguing and defending will depend not so much on his eloquence and persuasive powers, as on the objective reconcilability of the policies and positions of the two governments. The give and take of the whole great art of negotiation comes into play when the positions of the two governments are not irreconcilable. Negotiation never fails even when it issues in no

agreement; for even then it has succeeded in revealing what is possible.

2. The diplomat is always reporting back to his government the results of his efforts. He explains the attitudes and points of view of the government with which he is negotiating. He should be truthful, objective, thorough, well-informed, and should go into causes and underlying trends and general perspectives. He may indeed, where he can, he should-make suggestions, offer opinions, propose alternatives, but as he is not the sovereign he cannot act on the basis of his suggestions if they depart considerably from his formal instructions. The greatness of a diplomat is measured by more than one scale, but certainly he is a great diplomat who succeeds again and again-whatever the secret of his success-in making a decisive impact on the formation of national policy.

3. He must keep abreast of internal developments-political, economic, and intellectual and spiritual-at once in his own country and in the country where he resides. He can never achieve a grounded knowledge of developing conditions at home only from the formal instructions and communications he receives; he must supplement these by reading papers, magazines, books, special extensive reports, by receiving independent assessments from experts or friends, by talks with his diplomatic colleagues, etc. It is not difficult to tell the difference between a diplomat who really knows what is happening, at all levels, in his own country and in the country where he serves, and a diplomat who does not: the first speaks with a ring of depth and authority, the second mouths pathetic stilted platitudes.

4. Since the world has become an organism in which developments almost anywhere are likely to affect conditions almost everywhere, the ambassador, wherever his post, must know something and something pretty solid=-of the social and intellectual upheavals and the economic and political developments throughout the world. A diplomat who happens to serve at the United Nations for a length of time can acquire a profound knowledge of world affairs that he cannot experience anywhere else. Deeper than economic, social, and political developments are movements of the spirit and changes in fundamental attitudes, and the extent to which the diplomat senses and appreciates these realms measures his own intellectual-spiritual depth.

5. The diplomat must get to know directly the people of the country in which he resides through their institutions and literature; their museums; their political institutions; their universities, industries, churches, mass media; their thinkers and artists; their home and family life; life in small towns and villages. To penetrate, on the basis of mutual confidence, the mind and character of an industrialist, a labourer, a merchant, a university president, professor, or student, a churchman, or a humble peasant woman is as much the duty of a good diplomat as is meeting and negotiating with the representatives of the government. Such knowledge quickens and

vitalizes the diplomatic act itself, and endows it with substance and meaning.

6. The diplomat should be concerned not only with the foreign ministry of the country in which he resides-though he addresses his formal notes only to that branch of the government, sees only its representatives on formal items of business, and takes only what they communicate to him as the official position of their government. A diplomat should, when he can, cultivate, with complete straightforwardness, relations with all branches of the government: with its parliament, its judiciary, its armed forces, if possible, and even the municipal bodies.

7. The diplomat has responsibilities toward his colleagues in the diplomatic corps. He exchanges visits with them all the time and compares notes. He entertains and is entertained by them. He chats with them privately in functions and receptions. Soon he forms fairly intimate friendships with a few of them, whether on the basis of common political or common intellectual or spiritual interests, or purely on the basis of congeniality, and it is within this select circle that he profits and imparts most.

8. Toward his own staff he has special responsibilities. There is the courtesy and warmth of comradeship among colleagues attuned to the same end. There is the duty of leading, guiding, and coordinating while assuming the final responsibility himself. The ambassador must constantly fight any tendency of callousness on his part toward the needs, aspirations, and special problems of members of his mission. He must delegate responsibility even at the risk of error.

9. He must entertain; he must also attend all sorts of functions. Cocktail parties and general receptions are usually boring and even demoralizing, but sometimes a single exchange or contact transacted makes up for all the boredom suffered. It is at small dinners that diplomatic entertainment often achieves its maximum efficiency. “A good dinner goes a great way in diplomacy” was a conclusion of a British parliamentary committee (1861). Under this public function must also be included the diplomat’s daily mail and the many speaking invitations he receives.

10. A good hostess is a necessity for the proper functioning of diplomacy. Sir Ernest Satow’s observation on British custom applies to all countries: “If the diplomatist is married ... the social gifts, character, religion, past history, or original nationality of his wife may be an important ingredient in the determination of his appointment” (*see* Bibliography).

The diplomat’s responsibilities extend over all these ten functions. which may be viewed as different dimensions of the diplomatic act. Some serve as scaffolding and decor, some as base and background, some as means and occasion. some constitute the essence and end of the act itself. i\one of them can be dispensed with or reduced if the conduct of diplomacy is to attain such perfection as is open to it.

Theories about the Diplomatic Function.-There are two contrasting theories about the character of the diplomatic function. The theory of idealism rests only or principally on reason and persuasion: the theory of realism, recognizing in man, and especially in states, elements other than reason and the: lucidity of ideas. employs also the reason of power, for mighty is the argument of power even to reason. To the idealist, the sovereign or his representative should never intrigue or plot or engage in duplicity; to the realist, it is not a matter of "should" but of recognizing what is actually happening all the time among men and states. The idealist would rather perish than taint his conscience with evildoing; to the realist if his doing contributed to the perishing or weakening of his nation or culture, then that was the greatest evil. The idealistic theory holds that shining idealism and moral principles, and the justice of a cause. are sufficient defense; the realist retorts that history is littered with just causes obliterated by force. It is obvious that this schematized distinction is oversimplified. For there is no pure idealist and no pure realist-these arc but two poles between which theoretical opinion navigates. Real, existing human beings occupy an intermediate position.

When what is at stake are great issues of destiny the realistic diplomatist with a tinge of idealism would advise with Bismarck: "Be polite hut without irony ... "Even in a declaration of war one observes the rules of politeness ... Be civil to the very last step of the gallows, but hang all the same. One should only be rude to a friend when one feels sure that he will not take it amiss. How rude one is to his wife, for instance!" (Busch, vol. i, pp. 346, 321 ; *see* Bibliography.)

Typical of idealism would be Woodrow Wilson and of realism Machiavelli, Both paid dearly in their own persons for their views, the former by the Senate repudiating him, the latter by no prince employing him and by the most odious stigma attached to his name down the ages. Woodrow Wilson's idealistic doctrine of "open diplomacy" was refuted by his own conduct in Paris, where he engaged in a diplomacy of the strictest secrecy. Alexander and Napoleon, two great conquerors of history, were idealists in the sense that they were the carriers of an idea of which they were quite conscious, but under the weight of their idea they were the strictest realists in their dealings with others. Both Alexander and Napoleon bequeathed a civilizing political legacy of enduring value, both despite and on account of their realism.

The concern here is the actual, concrete, day-to-day and year-to-year international relations among independent, sovereign nation-states. What intelligible structures are discernible in these concrete relations? It would appear that Machiavelli approximates the law and norm of these relations more than any other thinker. Max Lerner is right when he asserts: "We live today in the shadow of a Florentine, the man who above all others taught the world to think in terms of cold political power. His name is Niccolo Machiavelli." And Lord Acton affirmed: "The authentic interpreter of Machiavelli is the whole of later history." He could have simply added, "the whole of history."

How the opprobrious sense of the terms “Machiavellian” and “Machiavellianism” arose is a fascinating study of one of the most famous slogans in history; accidents of history (late translations of Machiavelli), the disfigurement of Machiavelli by the Elizabethan drama, misquotations from him or quotations taken out of context, political malice, church politics, the fact that Machiavelli provided the hypocritical and self-righteous with a convenient target to attack, the sheer inertia of prejudice, and plain envy at a man who dared articulate the truth-all these played a role. Francis Bacon and Lord Acton, among many others, were more just in their appreciation of Machiavelli. Bacon’s robust empiricism enabled him to observe: “We are much beholden to Machiavelli and others, that write what men do, and not what they ought to do. For it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with the columbine innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the serpent; ... For without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced.”

The diplomat, most would agree, certainly should be truthful, honest, clean, a man of integrity and honour, and so on, to command the trust and respect of the government to which he is accredited, and indeed to be able to serve his own government. This does not mean that relations between independent and sovereign governments are all truthful, honest, clean, marked with integrity and honour. Cloak-and-dagger diplomacy in a thousand and one ways continues as strongly as it ever did in Byzantium or in the days of Machiavelli or Bismarck. If the ambassador is not carrying out this type of intrigue and warfare himself, others are charged with it by his own government, whether or not he knows it. Usually he knows it, but the process is so organized that his person is not implicated or compromised. When he does not know it, he knows that something is going on, though he may not know nor wish to know exactly what it is.

The truth is that governments; certainly the governments of the great powers, command “special forces” or “agencies” that serve them in this regard. Some diplomatic writers have moralized no end on the purity of the profession, and while they may be “pure” and “perfect” themselves-although this is not always self-evident nor can it ever be taken for granted-they know very well that immense “impurity” and “imperfection” characterize relations between nations, whoever is charged with conducting them-always, to be sure, with “the best of motives.” Nor can it be otherwise, so long as there is inveterate evil in the hearts of men, so long as the international order is one of sovereign nation-states, and so long as under this order the nations, whether from ambition, fear, distrust, simple self-interest, or for reasons of legitimate self-defense, or from ideological motivation, threaten one another’s security and existence.

There is not a single nation, now or in the past, that did not at some time in its existence, and especially at the crucial points when its existence itself was in the balance, practice one or another of the prescriptions of Machiavelli in his *Il Principe* (“The Prince”) and his *Discorsi sopra fa prima deca di Tito Livia* (“Discourses on the First Decade of Livy”). Some have exceeded him by far. One must therefore distinguish between the negotiator and his act of negotiation, and the overall external relations of his government. The negotiator and the act of negotiation must be absolutely above reproach: honesty, integrity, good faith, absence of any duplicity, and everything that conduces to mutual confidence must be assured; and when agreement is reached and ratified, it must be honoured "with religious scruple," as Richelieu would say. But the relations between the two governments are not exhausted by that single negotiation: there are hundreds of other relations going on all the time. It is with respect to these other relations which are not yet subjects of negotiation that intrigue, duplicity, scheming, and cloak-and-dagger "diplomacy" thrive.

Though one may have radical reservations about Machiavelli's maxims for *The Prince* (which always of course means the sovereign power in the state) in his relations to his subjects, about his doctrine of *virtu*, and about his philosophical anthropology-speaking here only of his theory of foreign relations between sovereign, independent states that have not combined their efforts for the common good-his doctrine of the "raison d'etat," as extended later by Richelieu to the nation-state, is at the base of all high statesmanship.

Whatever the mandate of the diplomat and however wide the latitude allowed him in his instructions, no diplomat has ever been authorized to betray his government or sell away his people, or to do anything that he knows will harm them. The greater evil is the destruction of his nation and the enslavement of his people, or whatever conduces toward that end, and so he will choose whatever lesser evil might enable him to avert that possibility, and then carry heroically the burden of the ensuing moral guilt. It is not an accident that treason is regarded by all systems of law in all ages as a most heinous crime.

What the student of diplomacy must always remember is that the diplomatist at home or abroad finds himself always before a given set of alternative lines of action, thrust upon him by given circumstances not of his own making. For he simply does not control the outside world that always obeys the law of freedom. These alternatives are often shady and questionable and each one of them involves the destruction of some value. The sovereign or his representative is never asked to choose the perfect and the good-he is often asked to choose between untidy and dark alternatives. It is not then a matter of perfection and conscience at all, except insofar as he tries most conscientiously to choose the least messy and evil among the presented alternatives. But evil and destruction of value there usually is, and the servant's only consolation is that any other choice would have been worse.

It should not be concluded from what is said here that international diplomatic relations are always murky, dark, charged with plotting, wile, and intrigue. The 50 to 100 diplomats in a small or big capital may be said to be honourable and honest men. Their relations among themselves and with the government are usually very friendly. Nor are the overall relations between their governments, when there is a real relaxation of tensions, marked with intrigue and wile. As a rule the greater part of diplomatic activity is friendly and aboveboard, but this is not always the case. The hidden side of diplomacy, the side of intense frustration and suffering is brought out here because the glittering side of pomp and ceremony, of the joy and excitement of open negotiation and debate, is so obvious and so deceptive. Moreover, even between friends and allies an area of privacy and freedom is always reserved, because the negotiating parties are still separate and sovereign, and because the friend of today could become the foe of tomorrow and the foe the friend.

When one considers the realists, it is not the falsehood of their theory about the diplomatic function that is disturbing, for the theory is true. What is absent is a glimpse of some ultimate hope. All power is doomed to decay and corruption, and therefore to know only power as the ground of ultimate trust is in reality to condemn one to despair. For the "realist" is counting on that which must sooner or later die. One does the best one can in the actual arena of responsible international politics, but one cannot rest there. In the midst of the community of interacting nations and quite apart from them and their interaction there must exist some genuine, solid ground of hope. One misses this "existing ground of hope" in the account as well as in the person of many a realist.

The Foreign Ministry and the Foreign Service.-In modern states the foreign ministry, because it handles relations with a hundred or so foreign governments, is one of the most important branches of the state apparatus. The foreign minister in many governments occupies a higher rank than his colleagues in the cabinet. Other branches of the government deal with internal affairs and their policies and decisions are immediately enforceable by the straightforward operation of domestic law, including the courts and the police. The operation of the foreign ministry is completely different. The decisions of policy that it must execute are not immediately enforceable because they relate to other governments that are sovereign, independent and free, and the word diplomacy characterizes precisely its relations to them. Even when states are bound by general international law or by treaties and conventions, the law does not abrogate their freedom, nor were the treaties imposed upon them. The most essential element in diplomacy is that it expresses the kind of intercourse possible "between independent and free rational entities." Given a community of such entities, there is no order possible among them except that of diplomacy. For that reason the foreign minister and his ministry have little to do directly with the other departments of state. He is the embodiment of the stance of his country and its people before the world. His perfections are not those of an administrator or politician, but those of a statesman, a diplomat, a negotiator, an ambassador, and representative, one who knows how to discuss with other governments topics of common interest on a footing of equality, and in dignity and honour.

The foreign minister is a member of the cabinet; he is, besides, in constant close touch, personally and through his staff, with all the forces that bear on the determination of policy. He supplies his government with pertinent information on the matter in question with his own explanations, comments and recommendations, information that he gathers from his ambassadors abroad, from the foreign ambassadors accredited to his government, from his own files and the studies of his staff. The government in its own exercise of sovereignty finally decides on the line of policy. Every relationship of every other branch of the government with other governments should be cleared and channeled through him, and as foreign policy bears critically on other government departments -commerce, defense, finance, publicity, etc.- considerable consultation and coordination should be going on all the time between a foreign minister and his staff and other ministers and theirs.

There are many terms designating the persons engaged in diplomacy, such as diplomat, diplomatist, diplomatic agent, negotiator, ambassador, minister, envoy, charge d'affaires, representative, legate, and nuncio. It was the Congress of Vienna in 1815 that regulated the question. of the classification of diplomatic agents, and this regulation dominated international usage until 1961 when another convention, again deliberated and concluded in Vienna, superseded it. The second Vienna Convention, elaborated under the aegis of the United Nations, took full cognizance of the first and built on it. Entitled the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), and comprising 53 articles as well as two separate optional protocols, it is a much more expanded instrument than the 8 articles of the first Vienna reglement, It was signed by 63 governments and, as of the early 1970s, it has been ratified by more than 50 and adhered to by over 40. It entered into force on April 24, 1964.

The Vienna Convention lays down rules and regulations for permanent missions. It discriminates three classes of heads of mission: (1) ambassadors or nuncios; (2) envoys, ministers, and internuncios; and (3) charges d'affaires. It sets down detailed rules for precedence, protocol, agrement, persona non grata, immunities, privileges, exemptions, inviolability, and other aspects. Depending on the size of the mission and the diversity of its operations, the staff of a mission could include counselor-ministers, counselors, secretaries of embassy, attaches (press, commercial, military, cultural, agricultural, etc.), secretaries, interpreters, couriers, and servants.

All members of the staff, with the exception of the technical attaches, come from foreign service cadres, and the overwhelming majority of the heads of mission themselves come these days from the same cadres. There are also political appointments from outside those ranks, especially in the large capitals. Sometimes a philosopher, or a professor, or the president of a university, or an industrialist is appointed from outside the circles of diplomacy altogether. The new nations of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East sent at the beginning of their diplomatic experience as their ambassadors abroad distinguished private citizens from almost all walks of life-doctors, writers, poets, professors, businessmen, lawyers.

Though the careerists probably know more than the nonprofessionals about the techniques and traditions of the art, and even perhaps about the facts of international relations, others bring with them special competences of their own. They are usually men of strong personality. Coming from other realms of experience they often bring fresh insight into the affairs of men and nations that could prove quite creative in diplomacy; tempered by the rough-and-tumble of the world of affairs, they are usually free and daring souls. Their sense of duty would not be stifled by narrow diplomatic professionalism; the habit of infighting within the ranks is unknown to them, and so they come to the assignment unconditioned and unembittered vis-a-vis their new colleagues or the foreign ministry. They may have powerful connections at home, and also where they serve abroad among congenial minds. They thus differ from the ordinary run of diplomats, and this difference itself commands attention and respect. The interests of the nation are supreme, and in these matters the only law is whether the sovereign has the wit, above every law and practice, to send the right man to the right place at the right time.

Ideal Qualities of Diplomats.-With policy decisions as well as with their execution there are always alternatives. No alternative is perfect. Judged by absolute standards, every alternative is probably immoral. Judged by the furtherance and defense of the interests of the nation, which are always the paramount consideration in the mind of the statesman and diplomat, the alternatives are more or less ideal. The range of alternatives imposed on a diplomat are not absolute, because he always deals with other free, sovereign, and equal governments, whose independent wills cannot be controlled. A diplomat must further take into account many concrete conditions, both at home and abroad. The moral principle comes into play only in the choice of the better alternative, never in the choice of the perfect. Someone is always being hurt or denied something. A burden of guilt is part of all diplomacy and statesmanship. Prior to every other quality and embellishment, then, two basic qualities of a diplomat are the moral ability to bear guilt and the moral competence to choose the better alternative.

The reader will find good accounts of the character of the ideal diplomat in many works on diplomacy. One of the best is that by de Callieres, a French diplomatist of the 18th century, quoted at length by Satow and Nicolson (see Bibliography). Lord Strang sums up the matter in the following observation:

> In the course of the last two and a half centuries a good many people have already written on this subject [the qualities and attainments of the diplomatist]; and their opinions, despite

> differences of emphasis, show an impressive measure of agreement. They have, that is, been unanimous in concluding that for the proper exercise of his profession the diplomatist requires very nearly all the known excellences of mind, of heart and of person . . . . Ideally speaking, nothing short of all-round perfection can be wished for in a man who is called upon to represent in his own person both his Sovereign and his country, and to handle things at once so difficult and so important for the future of the human race as are the official contacts between nations.
> (*The Foreign Office*, p. 26 [1955].)

In addition to the two primordial qualities stressed above, the resident ambassador must be able to fulfill all of the ten responsibilities, cited earlier, that devolve on his person. A broad general education is necessary for a diplomat, but his most essential preparation is philosophical, spiritual, personal-philosophical, to be able to interpret issues in the light of first principles; spiritual, to gain some insight into the mysterious depths of the human soul; personal, to develop that kind of maturity and firmness that will enable him to bear and overcome every knock and survive every disappointment.

The statesman and diplomat should be familiar with the lives, statements, speeches, and memoirs of the great statesmen and historians and public figures, among them Thucydides, Cicero, Grotius, Machiavelli, Richelieu, Catherine the Great, Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, Napoleon, Metternich, Disraeli, Bismarck, Mazzini, Marx, Lenin, Churchill, de Gaulle, Mao; and others. Among those of first importance are Thucydides, Machiavelli, Bismarck, Lenin, and Churchill. If one only were selected, he would be Thucydides.

The knowledge of a universal diplomatic language, like English or French, is vital. So is the mastery of the art of drafting, whose secret is simplicity, precision, and adequacy. While in his transmitting and interpreting function the diplomat should be absolutely truthful and precise, ambiguity is sometimes very useful in certain phases of diplomacy.

Secrecy is of the essence. The initial stages of all negotiation are all a matter of probing and exploring, and all positions at this stage are fluid and tentative. As negotiations proceed both parties must be vouchsafed the possibility, in total discretion, of changing or even reversing their positions without loss of face. For a variety of reasons this is impossible in the glare of publicity. No matter how much he tries to write down everything in his diaries. and whet-her in his will he permits them to be published immediately or fifty years after his death, a good diplomat is one who takes more than half of his secrets with him to the grave. That is one reason why history can never be fully known by man. Of great importance is integrity and modesty. Vanity is the besetting sin of the diplomatic life. A keen sense of humour about himself is necessary for his sanity. Nor may a responsible diplomat blame others if things go wrong. He defends and protects his assistants and never charges his failure to their bungling or their poor advice. He alone bears the full brunt of responsibility. Diplomacy has for its immediate subject matter objective compatibilities or incompatibilities between the interests of nations, and the job of the diplomat is to try to reduce the incompatibilities to a minimum. There is no rhetoric or magic or charm here; there is the hardest facing of hard and stubborn facts. The cultivation of the art of listening is also essential. It belongs to the essence of diplomacy to develop the habit or to be granted the grace of restful silence. In the diplomatic act there are levels of calm and detachment. The highest possible diplomatic decision should occur at the highest possible level of calm, namely, at the farthest possible distance from turmoil and excitement. At the critical moment the diplomatic act is a matter of decision; that is why loneliness belongs to its very essence; for decision is essentially a private affair. Not only should a good diplomat not fear loneliness-he must expect and bear terrific frustration. All because he is all the time dealing with inscrutable free wills beyond, both at home and where he is serving. The marvel is not the discord that causes the frustration, but that there is a measure of community and harmony among them. This bespeaks a common past and a common human nature.

Ritual and Language.-Five reasons explain the necessity for protocol, ceremonial, and ritual in diplomatic existence. (1) The diplomats represent their governments, and the honour accorded them is really meant for their government and people. (2) Without certain privileges they cannot perform their functions. (3) The diplomatic personnel constitute a class apart, and it is good for them to know what to expect when they move from capital to capital. (4) As international relations are exceedingly complex and delicate, an agreed procedural order helps the diplomats in conducting them. (5) The colour and beauty of pageantry, it has been said, contribute to an appreciation of higher things, and that is very helpful to diplomatic existence because its very object is peace and understanding, than which nothing is higher.

There are rules for proposing the appointment of a diplomat, rules for the *agrement* (approval by the state to which he is accredited) and the announcement of the appointment, rules for the presentation of his credentials, and a special protocol for the participation of the diplomatic corps in ceremonies, processions, and official visits.

Diplomats are entitled to all sorts of privileges and immunities on a reciprocal basis, such as the inviolability of the persons, communications, premises, and files and archives of the embassy; jurisdictional immunities-civil, criminal, and in relation to automobile accidents, tax and customs exemptions, and others detailed in the Vienna Convention of 1961.

Receptions and dinners, whether official or unofficial, are regulated by protocol concerning the mode of sending out and answering invitations. punctuality of attendance, the seating at table, and related matters. There are also general conventions for the use of visiting cards; for instance, for thanking a person, or for expressing condolences, or for bidding one farewell. Diplomats can seek advice and guidance on protocol questions from two sources; the special protocol section of the host government and the office of the dean of the diplomatic corps.

As every science and every art develops its own terms and form styles, diplomacy has over the centuries deposited peculiar modes of expression of its own in conformity with its subject matter. Latin was first the *lingua franca* of diplomacy, but French gradually replaced it. The right to use one's own language in diplomatic correspondence is now universally recognized, although French and English are still widely used by non- European countries. At the United Nations there are three working languages, English, French, and Spanish, and five official languages, these three plus Chinese and Russian, and texts in the five languages enjoy equal authenticity.

The available manuals describe at length the various forms of diplomatic communications. There is the note, the *note verbale*, the memorandum, the collective note, the identic note, and other forms of correspondence. Ways of beginning, addressing, writing, concluding, and signing communications are all prescribed. Recent usage has relaxed considerably, however, with respect to these formalities, and ordinary business letters are now frequently employed. Innumerable technical expressions, mostly Latin or French, with precise meaning in international law, are used in diplomatic relations between states.

Diplomatic language is reserved and formal. Its meaning is sometimes hidden. On the face of it, it is polite and tactful, but it may require a well-trained mind to plumb its depths. The advantage of such language, writes Sir Harold Nicolson, "is that it maintains an atmosphere of calm, while enabling statesmen to convey serious warnings to each other which will not be misunderstood." At the United Nations, twenty different ways were counted once of intimating diplomatically that "the honourable and distinguished delegate" was a liar.

Types of Diplomacy.- Nations are increasingly related to each other not only by twos but often in groups. Multilateral diplomacy takes place under five different occasions: (1) when envoys meet to coordinate policies among allies during the course of a war, as, for instance, in the Yalta Conference of 1945; (2) when envoys meet to conclude a peace treaty after the termination of a war, as, for instance, in the Congress of Vienna of 1814-15; (3) when nations meet in peacetime under some treaty organization to discuss the developing world situation in relation to their treaty obligations, as, for instance, when the NATO or the Warsaw Pact powers meet toward that end; (4) when international organizations hold their sessions as, for example, in the sessions of the organs of the United Nations; and (5) when a group of nations hold a conference on an ad hoc basis as the exigencies of history require, as, for example, in the Locarno Conference of 1925 and the 1945 founding conference of the United Nations.

Extensive preparations must precede multilateral parleys. The agenda must be carefully drawn up and the place and duration of the meeting decided upon; who invites whom, the rules of procedure and the organization of the conference, who will preside over the conference as a whole-all these and other matters must be gone into and determined by agreement. The technical and moral qualities of the diplomats participating in these conferences do not differ from those of other diplomats.

There is a difference in the diplomatic performance between conferences of allies and like-minded statesmen and such unrestricted conferences as the meetings of the organs of the United Nations, In the former there could be differences as to means among the participants but hardly as to ends; in the latter there are differences both as to ends and means. But everywhere in diplomacy the process is one of conciliation, adjustment, the quest of compromise, and the promotion of as much peace and concord as the objective situation permits.

The distinction between so-called private (or secret) and public (or open) diplomacy is false. Strictly speaking, all diplomacy is private or secret and there is not and there cannot be any public diplomacy. One cannot imagine Kennedy and Khrushchev in Vienna or Nixon and Mao in Peking meeting and conferring seriously on critical issues when everything they say is immediately broadcast to the whole world. At the most open and unrestricted conferences, such as those of the United Nations, the real work is done in secret, and what is displayed in plenary consists of agreements or disagreements already arrived at in private.

When the deliberating and negotiating circle is enlarged, the unstable or emotional, the immature or irresponsible begin to vie with one another in striking out for extreme positions. This is fatal for any possibility of agreement or compromise. Real possibilities of advance in agreement and peace have been irreparably ruined by competitive extremism. “The many” is the principle of turbulence and discord, “the one” the principle of unity and peace; and the closer the circle of negotiation is to “the one” (and the closest is two) the better chance it has to achieve concord and harmony. In no. 55 of The Federalist James Madison observes: “In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever character composed, passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.” The public at large is the most numerous and variable assembly possible, and to commit delicate diplomatic negotiations with foreign powers, at least in their formative stages, to public gaze and scrutiny is to place them at the mercy of a mob whose “passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason.” Direct negotiation between states does not always issue in agreement. When the matter is serious and “likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security," the Charter of the United Nations stipulates, in art. 33 (1), that parties to such a "dispute … shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice"; and when arbitration is resorted to, there are special international procedures which can be utilized, such as those provided by the United Nations Revised General Act of 1950 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

Types of Missions.-Diplomatic missions are either extraordinary and temporary or resident and permanent. Missions to sign an instrument of surrender or to attend an extraordinary event, such as a coronation or inauguration ceremony or the funeral services of a head of state'; missions for summit or other ad hoc conferences or for special purposes-commercial, educational, or military; and state visits of heads of state-are examples of extraordinary missions. Missions to inter-parliamentary conferences are not, strictly speaking, diplomatic missions, because they are not appointed by the executive but by the legislative branch of government, and because their purpose is not the negotiation of agreements or treaties between states. Certain broad rules of protocol, agreed upon ahead of time, apply to extraordinary missions, based on precedent, general usage, and the exigencies of the moment.

Permanent missions are those residing in capitals or near the headquarters of an intergovernmental organization, such as the United Nations or a specialized agency. The 1961 Vienna Convention recognizes in art. 14 only two types of permanent mission, according to whether the head of the mission is accredited to the head of state or to the foreign minister; and of the former there are two classes: (1) ambassadors or nuncios and (2) envoys, ministers, and internuncios. The term legation has virtually dropped from diplomatic usage.

Consuis.-Consulates are not diplomatic missions. Consuls are officials sent abroad not to negotiate with foreign governments but to assist and protect their fellow nationals who happen to be abroad, and to make sure that international agreements of various types-commercial, economic, educational-are observed. They are not diplomats but administrators and observers.

Until the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, consulates functioned under special bilateral agreements. That convention came into force on March 19, 1967. It provides detailed provisions concerning categories and functions of consuls (the functions including issuing of passports and visas, protection of minors, and making lawful investigations into the progress of the economic life of the country where they serve), the nature of their consular commission and the *exequatur* (written authorization) granted them, their privileges and immunities, the protocol applicable to them, the question of honorary consuls, and so on. The consular service is ordinarily a special department of the ministry of foreign affairs, but consuls are not diplomatic agents between two sovereign states.

HISTORY

Biblical Accounts.-Examples of supernatural diplomacy in biblical accounts are: God's negotiation with Noah about the ark (Gen. 6 and 7); God's call of Abraham (Gen. 12); the angel of the Lord's negotiation with Moses at the burning bush in the land of Midian (Ex. 3); the angel Gabriel's negotiation with Mary at the time of the annunciation (Luke 1:26-38).

Examples in the natural-historical order are: the covenant between Abraham and Abimelech at Beersheba (Gen. 21); Moses and Aaron's negotiations with Pharaoh on the exodus of the Hebrews from Egypt (Ex. 5 ff.); David's sending out ten young men to negotiate with Nabal the giving of provisions from the latter's bounty to David's band (I Sam. 25); Esther's negotiation with her husband Ahasuerus of the revocation of his edict against the Jews (Esth. 3 ff.); the Apostles first general conference when they issued an act (Acts 15).

The typical form of the diplomatic act is to be found in all these instances: free moral equals facing and arguing with each other either directly or by way of emissaries; nothing forced on anybody; as much tact, address, and ceremony employed as was known and practised at the time; the issue a freely negotiated agreement or covenant; the agreement then either faithfully observed or later treacherously denounced, with the disastrous consequences attending the act of treachery.

Primitive Cultures.-Ragnar Numelin gives numerous examples of diplomatic intercourse among primitive peoples (see Bibliography). He upholds the thesis that diplomacy is "as old as humanity itself, and its roots can be found among men of the stone age, in the prairies of Australia, with the oceanic peoples of the islands of the Pacific, among the Negroes of Africa and the Indians of North and South America, as well as the ancient peoples of China and India." Thus, through special messengers or envoys, the chiefs of primitive Australian tribes negotiate and conclude among themselves treaties of war and peace, of friendship and commerce. This institution of special diplomatic envoys is also to be found in the Fiji Islands, in the Malaysian Archipelago, in many regions in Africa such as that of the Bantu-speaking peoples including Uganda, among the Indians of North America, and among the ancient Mexicans. The envoys should be good orators, they should know well the diverse dialects, they should be trustworthy, loyal, of good reputation, and capable of standing the rigours of travel. They enjoy many immunities, including inviolability of person. They not only negotiate questions of war, peace, and commerce, but convoke the various tribes to a joint assembly in which questions of a general order are discussed, such as hunting or fishing expeditions, religious celebrations, and initiation rites. They submit to an elaborate protocol and ceremonial upon their departure on their mission, upon their reception by the tribe to which they are sent, and when they return home. Their mission is almost always attended by an exchange of gifts. They carry a special staff or baton on which certain signs are inscribed, and this staff serves at once as a diplomatic passport and letters of credence.

Ancient Asian Diplomacy.-Diplomatic intercourse and negotiation was practised extensively in the early histories of India, China, and Japan. The necessary attainments of messengers and envoys were specified and their instructions spelled out in detail. There are records of envoys sent by Japan to China in the 1st and 5th centuries A.D. The laws or code of Manu, the Manu Smriti, of ancient India (of uncertain date, somewhere between the 2nd century B.C. and the 2nd century A.D.) contain diverse provisions relating to politics, international law, commerce, and military affairs. Diplomacy, according to this doctrine, consists in the art of avoiding war and consolidating peace. It is in the hands of ambassadors to bring about either peace or war among princes. The diplomat should be wise, widely cultivated, cheerful, dedicated, and of honourable age. The accent throughout is on peace; the most complex questions in international existence should be regulated by diplomatic channels; and force comes always only in the second place.

The Near East.-The negotiating and concluding of treaties between states or political communities was well known in the Near East centuries before Christ and even before the flowering of Greek political culture. A biblical instance is a treaty between Hiram, king of Tyre, and both David and Solomon (If Sam. 5; I Kings 5, 9,10; I Chron. 14; II Chron. 2,8,9).

Ancient Egypt very early developed intense interest in foreign affairs. It cultivated a system of buffer states whereby the princes, and kings of Palestine, Phoenicia, Syria, and even at times parts of Mesopotamia were for centuries its vassals. Under Tutankhamen a foreign service was already organized along lines remarkably analogous to those of modern states. Heinrich Wildner holds that the external politics of this period of Egyptian history "was already in part equal to that with which Great Britain has exercised its dominion over various important points of the globe." A foreign office in Thebes was well organized; its personnel were divided into classes and ranks; and the *lingua franca* was not hieroglyphic Egyptian but cuneiform Assyro-Babylonian, for the outside world did not know the Egyptian language and characters.

An interesting diplomatic correspondence between Egypt and the princes of Mesopotamia, going back to the 15th and 14th centuries before Christ, was discovered last century, at Tell el Amarna in Egypt. Of far greater significance was the defensive and offensive treaty concluded in the 13th century B.C. between Ramses II of Egypt and Hattusilis III, king of the Hittites. This is the oldest document of international law so far discovered, arxl, according to Serguiev in

Vladimir Potemkin's *Histoire de la diplomatie*, it serves as "a model for the kingdoms of the ancient Orient, for Greece, and for Rome in all their subsequent treaties." It is not necessary here to go into the diplomacy of Assyria, Babylon, and Persia which came upon the political scene of the Middle East after the decline of Egypt.

Diplomacy presupposes resiliency of spirit and the habit of compromise, and, as Harold Nicolson never tires of pointing out, these flourish best in business transactions. The Phoenicians were given in their international relations principally to the trading idea. In such negotiation the motivating principle was not the imposition of their will, nor the domination or obliteration of an enemy, but mutual advantage between them and those with whom they were trading, so that both would survive the transaction in freedom and both would be the better for it. For such a spirit there are no enemies-everybody is a potential friend with whom one can come to an understanding or make a business deal. In peacefully dotting the Mediterranean coasts with their colonies, in dominating the great sea for centuries with their navigation, in spreading the alphabet and the taste for luxury goods, and in promoting commercial conventions such as bartering rules and a system of weights and measurements, the Phoenicians must have been accomplished nonpolitical diplomatists.

Ancient Greek Diplomacy.-Diplomacy comes into being only when political communities interact with each other. No people were in more active intercourse with one another in war and in peace than the Greek cities. When they were not fighting they were arguing with one another in some assembly or other. They loved both verbal and bloody fights, and they always had something they considered worth arguing about or fighting and even dying for. In Homer are detailed accounts of diplomatic missions; one such mission was to try to bring back Helen to her husband from Troy. Odysseus is depicted as a magnificent ambassador addressing the Trojan Assembly. Already diplomats were sent out on missions with specific instructions, were granted privileges and immunities, presented and argued their case before the assembly, and already there were customs restraining the excesses of war for fear of the gods.

The main features of Greek diplomacy may be summarized as follows. For a particular mission (there were at that time no permanent resident missions) good ambassadors were picked out, "elders" as they were called, wise, respectable, incorruptible, good orators. of good memory, and knowledgeable about affairs. The missions entrusted to them included negotiations for peace, friendship, and commerce, treaties of alliance, request for military or financial aid, or exchange of gifts. Embassies always comprised more than one person (sometimes as many as ten), partly because the Greeks did not trust their diplomatists, partly from a characteristic sense of fairness to all points of view. They were accompanied by servants and secretaries and they were barely paid their travel expenses. They had to be duly accredited and carry precise instructions. They explained their mission in set speeches before the foreign dignitary or assembly to which they were sent and they answered any questions put to them. They were treated with courtesy, invited to private homes, and often asked to attend official public functions. If successful in their mission, they would be honoured by their compatriots with special rewards upon their return. If a treaty was concluded, it would be engraved on a tablet for public view, and there would be solemn public oaths by both parties pledging their respective cities to fulfill its terms.

The Greeks developed the *proxenos* or consul institution, whereby city A would appoint an eminent citizen of city B to receive its embassies or private citizens and to extend to them due hospitality when they went to city B, and in general to facilitate their public or private affairs (Demosthenes served as *proxenos* of Thebes at Athens). They developed leagues and alliances that met in amphictyonic councils for religious celebrations, in which they also discussed intercity political matters, and this helped to develop in them the habit of stretching their political thinking beyond the narrow limits of their city. They recognized principles of international law relating to the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace, the ratification and sanctity of treaties, arbitration and neutrality, diplomatic privileges and immunities, exchange of ambassadors, and such conventions of war as the position of aliens, the right of asylum, and extradition. They looked upon certain principles as divinely ordained, and as such they held them applicable not only among themselves but between Greeks and barbarians. The notion of a universal law of nature had thus clearly dawned. There was no distinction in the conduct of their diplomacy between the executive and the legislative branches of government, their democracy being popular and not representative. When the city-states were overrun by Macedonian might, this popular, open, free diplomacy that they had practised was replaced by strictly cabinet diplomacy of an absolute monarchy. In this respect Byzantium later was the heir of Macedonia and Rome, and not of Athens.

Roman Diplomacy.- The Romans were handicapped by their political philosophy. As diplomacy requires an international community of free and independent entities interacting with one another on the basis of reciprocity, and as the Romans did not recognize such a community, diplomacy in the strictest sense was foreign to them. “The other” as an international political category did not exist for them, but negotiation is impossible except with a genuine “other.” There was an “other” for the Greeks, to wit, the “other” Greek city, and so they could negotiate among equals; but there was no “other” Roman city or state. Even in early Republican days Rome soon dominated its confederates and allowed them no equality and no freedom. In the days of the Empire there was no question of recognizing anybody as free and equal either within or beyond the confines of the Roman realm. Negotiation between equals simply did not belong to the great Roman genius.

For the purposes of this article it is enough to point out the following features of Roman diplomacy. Ambassadors (*legati, oratores, caduceatores*) were chosen from the Senate or the nobility, and the Senate gave them their credentials and instructions and they had to report back to it. As with the Greeks. embassies (*legationes*) were sent for all purposes-military, political. commercial-and were composed of from two to ten members. oi whom one was chief (*princeps legationis*). The members of the embassy were well paid. Wars were declared and treaties concluded by the College of Fetials through its chief, the *pater petratus*, in accordance with a special ritual. Diplomatic immunities and privileges were granted to ambassadors received in Rome and to their staffs, but not to their correspondence or residence or servants. Foreign diplomats who committed any offense against Roman law during their sojourn in Rome were immediately deported back home to be tried by their own courts. A special body adjudicated claims and disputes about the rights and privileges of foreign diplomats. An embassy coming to Rome had to wait outside and could only be allowed to enter the city and be heard by the Senate after its credentials had been verified and permission to that effect granted by the competent authorities. A Carthaginian embassy was refused entry and audience, treated as spies (*speculatores*) and immediately sent back to Carthage.

The Romans inserted provisions in their treaties demanding hostages from the other party to make sure that the terms of a treaty would be observed; they never reciprocated with hostages of their own. Often they dictated the terms of treaties and imposed precise time limits for the duration of negotiations. They boasted of their good faith and stressed the principle of the sanctity of treaties, but they often managed by casuistical interpretations to evade terms to which they were pledged.

Under the Empire foreign affairs, including the sending and receiving of embassies, were handled exclusively by the emperor himself through his immediate personal cabinet, although at first he sought the consent of the Senate. Despite the fact that the *Pax Romana* was often most oppressive on the diverse peoples on whom it was imposed, and that Rome rejected in international practice the category of “equal others,” yet the great legal genius of Rome whereby its jurists elaborated detailed distinctions between various types of law (*jus sacrum, jus feciale, jus civile, jus gentium, jus peregrinum, jus naturale*), especially the stress under the influence of stoicism on universalism in matters of general human justice, as well as the inculcation among a multitude of dependent peoples and nationalities of the habit of peace under one central imperial authority, were among Rome’s permanent contributions to political theory, to international law, and to the foundations of diplomacy. (*See* further ROMAN LAW.)

The Romans won many diplomatic victories, some quite decisive in history, without recourse to arms, or at least when they had to resort finally to the arbitrament of force they had already divided and weakened their enemies by diplomatic stratagems to the point that they could confidently expect to defeat them. This is the motto: *Divide et impera.* The following are examples of Roman diplomatic victories: when they aroused the Greeks against the Macedonians; when they intrigued against Hannibal by dividing the Nurnidians, his allies, from him; when the diplomacy of an embassy headed by Gracchus succeeded in breaking up the tripartite alliance of Hannibal, Antiochus of Syria, and Philip of Macedonia against them; when the diplomacy of another embassy headed by Martius succeeded in winning over another king of Macedonia : when another embassy met another Antiochus of Syria in Alexandria and caused him to quit Egypt altogether; the great diplomatic pacification of Gaul by Julius Caesar; when Armenia became a vassal of Rome by its prince being brought over to Rome and crowned by Nero (66 A.D.) king of Armenia. All this lends some truth to Hannibal's statement: "The power of Rome does not reside in her military force, but in the art of dividing her enemies." (*See* further ROMAN HISTORY.)

Byzantine Diplomacy.-On the ruins of the Roman Empire four conditions supervened that favoured the development of diplomacy. Distinct political communities arose, based on natural ethnic, cultural. or geographic demarcations, juridically more or less equal vis-a-vis one another. The invading barbarians were gradually civilized by adopting Roman ways, including the use of Latin which was the only possible *lingua franca* in their intercourse among themselves. On top of native barbarian diplomatic usages, which, as we saw characterized and still characterize diplomatic practices in primitive cultures, the successor states or communities inherited a Graeco-Roman legacy rich in diplomatic rules and precedents. And the Christianizing of these barbarians provided another underlying moral community among them. Thus grew a multiplicity of more or less equal and independent political entities brought together in the all-embracing community of Graeco-Roman-Christian civilization. This is precisely the soil-political diversity amidst underlying community–in which the genuine diplomatic act could take place.

For various reasons the international centre of gravity passed from the first Rome to the second-Constantinople. Byzantine diplomacy was marked by special features that proved decisive in all subsequent development. The court of Constantinople established diplomatic relations with many barbarian domains and was in the habit of paying them enormous sums of money to ensure their friendship; Attila, king of the Huns, was thus liberally treated and withal designated "military chief of the Empire." Byzantine diplomatic institutions and ceremonial served as models and were gradually adopted in barbarian courts, including those of the Franks and the Visigoths. The court of Constantinople was the meeting place of embassies from all over Europe, Asia, and Africa, all attired in their native costumes and speaking their mother tongues. There was a department of foreign relations engaging an enormous personnel with capable interpreters. A most complicated ceremonial was developed to receive foreign dignitaries and impress them with the might and splendour of the Empire. Surrounded all the lime with spies, they were nevertheless shown the most fantastic spectacles. They were not only received by the emperor but also by the empress and other high personages of the capital. On their first solemn audience they prostrated to the ground and presented the emperor with gifts from their countries, and themselves received in return gifts from the emperor. Subsequently their affair would be studied by the chancellery and before they returned home they would be handed the precise response of the state to their mission.

The ambassadors sent out, who always belonged to the nobility, submitted to special regulations, had to abide strictly by their instructions, and on their first audience with the foreign sovereign had to present their letters of credence and state their mission. Sometimes two sets of instructions were issued-one overt and one secret. As Roman legates they were required to conduct themselves with perfect dignity; they could not be too polite and amiable nor too generous with their dispensations and gifts. While ostensibly they were instructed not to interfere in the internal affairs of the countries to which they were sent. secretly they could indulge in all sorts of intrigue. The inviolability of the persons of ambassadors was recognized in Constantinople and elsewhere, although at times ambassadors were actually detained and imprisoned.

The spread of Christianity helped in consolidating the Empire, but only up to a point. The Byzantine principle of Christian Hellenism clearly separated the temporal from the spiritual realm. Empresses sometimes played determinant roles in the external policies of the court, especially Theodora in relation to her husband Justinian.

The Byzantine government assembled and conserved immense data on the barbarians-on their morals and customs, military capabilities, commercial and other relations, internal disorders, and princes, and the possibility of seducing or bribing them. Byzantine diplomacy was saturated with endless scheming, intrigue, and secrecy and with duplicity, spying. and bribery. It made extensive use of artifice, deceit, and ruse, and its attitude was one of suspicion and fear. It employed foreigners as mercenaries to fight its wars or one another. When it could not defeat its enemies directly, it resorted to encircling them politically and economically.

One can easily moralize in a self-righteous spirit against the principles and practices of Byzantine diplomacy. The question is whether one would have done-indeed whether one could have done-differently (except for doing away with certain crudenesses, excesses. and fantasies) if one were in the place of the emperors. heed as they were with perpetual disorder within and perennial turbulence without. When some nations of Western Europe, which were more fortunate than Constantinople from the point of view of internal homogeneity and external security, became themselves responsible for world empires, they did not, we may be sure, abstain from employing Byzantine diplomatic methods. World empires with capitals at the heart of the world are simply unfortunate. Berlin and Moscow in subsequent epochs discovered that it was not enviable to have to fight on two external fronts at the same time; Constantinople had to fight perpetually on four external fronts and on as many fronts internally. If Byzantine methods are morally bad-and of course they are-and if vast empires must resort to such methods if they are to survive, no matter how much they might sweeten or refine or camouflage them, or otherwise render them palatable, then the only conclusion to be drawn, from the moral point of view, is that the imperial system must give way to pluralistic internationalism whereby diverse peoples and nations take their destinies in their own hands and interact with one another on the basis of independence, freedom, and sovereign equality.

Upon their rise and conquest of a large part of the globe under the banner of Islam, the Arabs did not practise diplomacy in the strict sense. In this respect they resembled the Romans. Either they were at war with the “other” or, if at peace, then it was the peace of the Arabs. This is the meaning of the division of the world by them into the land of Islam (*Dar-ul-Islam*) and the land of war (*Dar-ul-Harb*); meaning that peace is recognized only under Islam. *Jihad*, or holy war, was enjoined on the faithful in relation to the realms beyond. Thus there were no genuine diplomatic external relations, no real negotiations. Men had to submit to Islam to enjoy peace and equality.

One may read of tributes paid by a Byzantine empress to a caliph, and by a caliph to an emperor; of the establishment of friendly relations between Charlemagne and Harun al-Rashid, the great caliph of Baghdad, and of a number of embassies and presents exchanged between them; of the emperor Theophilus dispatching envoys to the Saracens in Spain requesting aid; of the caliph al-Muqtadir receiving in his unbelievably magnificent palace in Baghdad, with great ceremony and pomp, the envoys of the young Constantine VII; of treaty relations between crusaders and Muslim princes, which were always temporary arrangements; of an elaborate ministry of foreign affairs, *Diwan al-Rissalet*, as one of seven ministries in the Abbasid court in Baghdad; of procedures and instructions for sending and receiving embassies very much similar to those employed by Byzantium; and even of a pope (John VIII) paying tribute to the Muslims for two years.

But in all this there was hardly a recognition of “the other” in the sense of negotiating and establishing stable relations with him. Even the so-called “alliance” between Harun al-Rashid and Charlemagne appears to be legendary, as we know of it only from Western sources, and Muslim authors are wholly silent on it.

If one thus keeps in mind that the Arab Muslims owe their diplomatic practice to a large extent to Byzantine influence, that the Ottomans, as successors to the Byzantine Empire, inherited this Empire’s diplomatic philosophy, that the Russians imbibed diplomatic method from the same fount, that the Italian city-states copied Byzantine procedure, and that later France and, through France, Europe and the whole world copied the Italians, if one thus sees that north, east, south, and west all learned from Constantinople, perhaps that is the most astounding fact in the history of diplomacy.

Renaissance Diplomacy.- The Italian city-states–chiefly Venice, Florence, Genoa, Milan, and the Vatican–were the founders of present-day diplomacy. There was perpetual tension and rivalry among them. Italy had always had close ties with Byzantium and the eastern Mediterranean, and the Italians were simply impregnated with Byzantine diplomatic methods. Whether they would have developed a different style had they not fallen under the influence of Constantinople no one can say, but what is certain is that the conditions of their political existence–chronic internal instability, perpetual external danger, and the general turmoil and disorder of the times–exhibited remarkable analogies to the situation obtaining in and around the empire of the East. In the absence of an overall political unity, which had to wait until the 19th century to mature, these rival dominions found it expedient, for their own survival as a system of interacting independent states, to employ and perfect exactly the methods devised by the emperors for the survival of their realm. Machiavelli was defended above as the most important diplomatic theoretician of that period who formulated the kind of precepts and rules that fit precisely a world of jealous and competing and ambitious sovereign entities. These principles and precepts apply not only to the unstable, uncertain and extraordinarily fluctuating relations among the city-states of Renaissance Italy, but also to the nation-states of later centuries, because the passionate patriotism of the former was simply transmuted into the radical nationalism of the latter.

The motto of Renaissance diplomacy was formulated by one of its earliest theoreticians, Ermolao Barbaro. who wrote while serving as Venetian resident ambassador in Rome toward the end of the 15th century a small treatise entitled *De officio legati*. “The first duty of an ambassador,” wrote Barbaro, “is exactly the same as that of any other servant of a government, that is, to do, say, advise and think whatever may serve the preservation and aggrandizement of his own state.” This is an exact expression of the first principle of ambassadors not only of the Italian city-states of Barbaro’s day, but of every nation-state and government since.

Could the Athenians of old have produced what they did produce–in literature and art, in philosophy and science, in all the amenities of culture and civilization–without the intense self-pride, self-consciousness, and self-jealousy of their great city? Similarly, could the wonderful flowering and creativity of the Renaissance have occurred without the intense rivalry, self-pride, self-consciousness, and mutual exclusivity of the Italian city-states? And who could be sure that other diplomatic methods than those employed would have better preserved those states and set them free to create? In the grand enterprise of existence some value is always sacrificed for the sake of something else, and the only question is whether the value sacrificed-most certainly valuable in itself-was inferior or superior to the value coveted and attained. It all depends then on one's scale of ultimate values: if one subordinates the spiritual and personal to the political and general, one will suppress freedom, individuality, creativity for the sake of peace and order; if one cares most for the freedom and creativity of the spirit, one will compromise in matters of peace and political perfection.

The Italian city-states had immense commercial and banking interests in Europe and the Levant; they built up diplomatic connections of the most extensive and useful kind; they sent out brilliant ambassadors, among them Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio in the 14th century, 'Sforza in the 15th. and Machiavelli and Guicciardini in the 16th. Venice was unrivaled in its cultivation of the art of diplomacy and became the diplomatic teacher of the whole of Europe. In addition to its official representatives, Venice employed many secret agents-women, doctors, monks, pilgrims everywhere it had vital interests. The official and unofficial agents as well as the commercial and banking representatives sent back immense volumes of information on the countries where they served, so that no one in the world was then more informed on all aspects of international affairs than the Signory of the Republic of Saint Mark. The diplomats were required to be. and on the whole they were, honourable men. but the state did not scruple to employ, with or without their knowledge, all manner of artifice, duplicity, intrigue. playing its enemies against one another in all kinds of combinations, and even at times political assassination, in fact all the vicious practices of Byzantine diplomacy, refined and perfected by the artistic genius of the Italians.

Strict and detailed instructions were given the ambassadors. On returning they should hand over to the state all the presents they received abroad. They were not allowed to accept any honours or distinctions from the courts to which they were sent, nor would they be assigned to countries where they owned property or had private financial dealings. They should never discuss politics with foreigners or with other diplomats. They could not take their wives with them lest they gossip. but they could take their own chefs for fear of being poisoned. When permanent embassies were established, an ambassador could not leave his post until after his successor had arrived. Upon his return from his mission he should sign his name in a special register and submit a statement of his expense account. Harsh measures were imposed upon those who, because the remuneration was poor and the personal hazards and inconveniences immense, refused to take up missions to which they were appointed. Ingenious codes and ciphers were extensively used, although they were easily decipherable. The Venetians were the first to develop and treasure diplomatic archives and preserve their state records in systematic order. Xicolson points out that "their diplomatic documents cover the nine centuries from 883 to 1797 and contain the instructions given to. and the official despatches received from, the ambassadors sent to foreign countries. As many as 21,177 of such despatches are still preserved." The Signory used to send their envoys *avvisi* or "news-letters," by which they kept them abreast of developments at home. And on returning the diplomats were to deliver before them a "relation" summing up their whole mission. Some of these perceptive "relations" were excellent and constitute today valuable sources for the historiography of those centuries.

But the most important positive contribution of the Italian citystates in this field was the establishment of permanent resident missions–in fact this may be regarded as the most important single development in the history of diplomacy. 1here may have been precursors or suggestions of this in the institution of consuls that the I talians had set up for their colonies in the great cities of the Levant (Constantinople, Alexandria, etc.), or in procurators and banking agents, or in the pope's envoy at the court of Constantinople, but the first resident permanent embassy between independent and sovereign states appears to be, according to Nicolson, that sent by the duke of Milan to Cosimo de' Medici in 1450. Within 15 years, resident embassies spread all over Italy and Europe. The representatives sent could be nobles or commoners.

During the 15th and 16th centuries a whole body of literature arose describing the intellectual and moral prerequisites of a good ambassador. He must be a learned man, a good linguist, above all a master uf Latin; he must be hospitable, employing an excellent cook; he must be patient, imperturbable, resourceful in negotiation, with morally unimpeachable private life. Lord Strang remarked that all those cataloguings of the qualities of the perfect ambassador amounted in the end merely to saying that he must be endowed "very nearly (with) all the known excellences of mind. of heart and of person."

Political and commercial treaties were negotiated between sovereign equals, although the pope often interfered in the process, and validation of a treaty by papal notaries was considered most binding. The problem of precedence among diplomats became exceedingly troublesome, leading to the most absurd incidents in the great European courts. Questions of protocol and ceremonial covered every minute detail of the conduct of an ambassador and a sovereign when in the presence of each other. The question also arose as to who should sign a concluded treaty first, and diplomacy resorted to ingenious device; in trying to solve this problem, including, where several signatures were involved. disposing them in a circle. since a circle begins at any point. It was not until the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15 that what were vexing problems of precedence and order were once and for all settled.

Modern Times up to World War H.–The diplomacy of today is rooted in practically every detail in what evolved from the practices of the Italian city-states. The organization and operations of virtually every foreign ministry can be traced to Renaissance principles. These principles were further developed and perfected by the French, but they took over the seminal ideas from their

Italian masters. The independent and sovereign units were first city-states, now they are nation-states. This is the most fundamental difference, but it is a difference of scope and not of essence.

There have been continuously a central department of foreign affairs. a minister at its head, a diplomatic service, permanent resident embassies both near one's government and abroad, categories of missions and diplomats, diplomatic privileges and immunities, letters of credence more or less of the same form. formal and informal instructions. ceremonies of reception and ceremonies of termination of mission, methods and practices of conducting negotiations, concluding agreements, and developing friendly relations, a well-refined diplomatic language, a special art for the drafting of despatches and reports, the use of code and cipher, special protocol and ceremonial, special etiquette among members of the diplomatic corps, and vexing problems of ceremonial and precedence that were first resolved among the Europeans at the Congress of Vienna and then regulated on a world scale by the Vienna Convention of 1961.

If in the course of development during the last few centuries the rules of precedence were changed from those first devised by the Holy See, an order of precedence there still is. If categories of missions and diplomats are simplified, categories there still are. If there is today what is called "diplomacy by conference," practically all fruitful negotiation still occurs, as it has always occurred, in confidential meetings between very few authorized people, almost exactly as de Callieres and Louis XIV wanted it to transpire. And "the first duty of an ambassador" has not changed from Ermolao Barbaro's concept of it at the end of the 15th century– "to do, say, advise and think whatever may best serve the preservation and aggrandizement of his own state." A few special features may however be underlined.

French replaced Latin as the *lingua franca* of diplomacy. This was not only due to the French hegemony of the l 7th and 18th centuries; international relations, enlarged as they were beginning to be beyond Western Christendom with its common Latin base, required a living tongue as the vehicle of contact and negotiation. French was perfectly suited to that end, partly because it was so easy for it to take over much of its diplomatic exactness from its mother the Latin, partly because of the genius of the language which tends to clarify in neat categories, partly because at that very moment this genius was maturing one of its greatest products, the logic and method of Descartes, partly because French diplomacy developed its tools of expression in the hurly-burly of the most intense international activity that any nation-state had known until that time. Even in the 19th century, when the supremacy of the French language was beginning to be contested, if any one language was considered the language of diplomacy, it certainly was French. It was not until the San Francisco Conference of 1945 that French had to put up an heroic tight for barely maintaining its parity with English. and today English is gradually replacing it as the *lingua franca* of diplomatic intercourse.

Foreign relations. especially under Richelieu. became more and more centralized in one department of government. the ministry of foreign affairs, although the duality between the sovereign and the foreign minister in the direction of foreign policy, especially in the days of absolute monarchies, never quite disappeared, and even today there are many heads of state overseeing at least two diplomacies at the same time, a personal diplomacy of their own and the diplomacy of their principal minister for external affairs.

The principle of the "raison d'etat" that was clearly formulated by Machiavelli for the city-state became the fundamental principle in the conduct of all nation-states. The state. being the effective political arm of the nation, has a reason and an ethic of its own, before which all subordinate reasons and ethics must bow.

At the same time, just as Cicero and the Ruman jurists in general. under the influence of the universal ism of the Stoics. asserted the equality of all men before the higher law of nature, so, beginning in modern times with Hugo Grotius, the idea began to take shape–an idea that undoubtedly had its roots in stoicism and scholasticism–that there was another law of nature, stemming from the same source as that of the first law, namely. from the nature of things as correctly apprehended by human reason, a law this time, not above individual human beings. but above all states and sovereignties. Before this higher law all nation-states were equal. Just as there was a "common good" within the nation, so there was a "common good" among the nations. The conduct of foreign affairs since then has had to reckon with a growing body of recognized "international law" governing the community of nations in their interaction with one another, in war and in peace.

The distinction between ruler and ruled began gradually to sharpen and take decisive shape, and therewith the self-consciousness and power of the ruled. The ruler should be responsive in the formation and prosecution of policy, whether internal or external, to the will of the ruled. "The people" are the ultimate sovereign, and all other "sovereigns" must be subordinate to their will. The government is primarily to serve their interests and not the interests of those who govern them. If the rulers rebel against the will of the people, however the people express that will or conceive their interests, then that rebellion justifies the people's rebellion against them. Hence ushered in the age of revolutions. This dynamic democratic principle was first consecrated by the English Revolution of 1688-89 from which Parliament emerged as the leading partner in an harmonious cooperation between itself and the crown, and the crown never again attempted to govern without Parliament or contrary to the expressed will of the House of Commons. A century later this principle of the sovereignty of the people was sealed by the American and French revolutions, from which time onwards the maxim, *vox populi, vox Dei,* no matter how much it is susceptible of being abused, both by ruler and ruled. and no matter how much in fact it has been abused, became the dominant political principle all over the world. Elected assemblies have since been instituted everywhere, whether or not "the people" appreciated or even at times wanted them, and to the extent to which these assemblies have effectively asserted their authority, foreign policy has gradually ceased to be the exclusive determination of an autocrat, and has had to respect the will, or at least seek the consent, of the people as expressed by their duly elected representatives, as well as by all manner of other popular voices, including the press, the competition between political parties, the diverse pressures of groups and interests, and that strange but very real and potent animal called "public opinion." Even in countries with a single party rule, as in the Communist countries, where it may be said that the party conceives itself as knowing the interests of the people better than the people themselves, and therefore is entitled to lead them, the democratic principle probably is often operative at least within the councils of the party itself. When such rule degenerates into a dictatorship by a single person, "court revolutions" have often replaced "the cult of personality" with what is now termed "collective leadership." But even beyond the confines of the single party and its collective leadership, such systems of government. in the nature of the case, show great sensitivity in the development of their policy, both internal and external, toward whatever "public opinion" exists among their own people. and certainly toward "world public opinion." "The people," in one form or another, and despite occasional reverses, have been increasingly functioning at the base of all policy and diplomacy.

The character of the diplomatic act as that of representation, negotiation, and conciliation between sovereign nation-states through accredited diplomatists has not essentially changed for three or four centuries, yet it has been taking place on a background of new and at times shifting factors that may here be simply enumerated: (1) the emergence of a number of European world powers in the 18th and 19th centuries, principally Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia, and the operation of a system of balance of power among them, with Great Britain as the principal balancer; (2) once against France under Napoleon in the 19th century and twice in the 20th against Germany, the other powers combined to prevent one power from dominating the whole of Europe; (3) the rise of European nationalism among the many cultures and nationalities of the continent, and the self assertion of this nationalism, first against France and then against Germany and Austria; (4) the imperialist scramble for Africa and Asia among the European powers; (5) the enormous development of science and industry, introducing radical changes in the power of the developed nations, and in their economic and political relations toward the underdeveloped peoples, and affecting many of the mechanical techniques used in diplomacy; (6) the emergence of the United States as a world power after World War I, with its ideas of openness. freedom, anticolonialism, self-determination, and world organization; (7) the League of Nations as a first attempt at world, as distinct from purely European, organization;

(8) the rise of Soviet Russian Communism as a world revolutionary movement with a special attitude toward sovereignty, nationalism, and international relations; (9) the rise of fascism and Nazism as radical forms of nationalism with aggressive policies based on their own special theories of race and culture and their own special attitudes toward sovereignty, nationalism, and international relations; (10) the weakening, followed after World War II by the dissolution, of the old European colonial system and the rise of the new independent nations of Asia, Africa. and the Middle East; and (11) the rise of Asian great power centres.

Diplomacy since World War II.–Most of the factors enumerated in the preceding section, constituting what might be termed the environment of the diplomatic act, are still critically relevant to this act today. Even the crushing of Nazi Germany has not solved the basic German question, for diplomacy is still struggling, and will continue to struggle for a long time, with the formidable problem of the place in the world of 90,000,000 German-speaking peoples, with all their immense genius and culture. at the heart of Europe. Nor has the collapse of the great European colonial empires absolved responsible diplomacy from facing up to the relations of the more developed to the less developed peoples of the world. If empire in the old sense has gone, the essential need of “the less” for “the more” remains a most puzzling diplomatic problem.

Since World War II six conditions have arisen which deterrninantly bear on the diplomatic act:

1. The first condition stems from the enormous technologic progress made in instantaneous communication and fast transportation. Ambassadors are given the title “plenipotentiary”; they are thus vested by their sovereigns with full powers vis-a-vis the governments near which they reside. This “plenipotentiary” character was a necessity when communications between capitals took days and weeks and sometimes months. Today, not only are ambassadors in constant daily and hourly touch with their chiefs, but foreign ministers and heads of state can arrange to meet one another in top-level conferences within a matter of hours, or can at any time communicate with one another by telephone. All this occurs with the full knowledge and collaboration of the ambassadors, yet the frequency and the ease with which governments have resorted to summit conferences and direct summit communications have diminished the plenipotentiary stature of ambassadors. Despite all this, so far as the necessity of haying an authorized person on the spot is concerned, not only to represent his country in the country where he is serving, not only to maintain constant direct contact with the government to which he is accredited, and not only to build up first-hand cumulative knowledge of conditions, but to carry out the preparatory arrangements for the summit meetings themselves, there is no substitute, and there will never be one, for the resident ambassador.

2. There is, secondly, the bipolarism between Washington and Moscow. The city-state system of the Greeks and the Italians gave way to the nation-state system of Europe of the last four

centuries, and this latter now appears to be giving way, on a world scale, to the superpower bipolar system of America and the Soviet Union–and this exactly at a time when there are 140 or so independent and sovereign states. Every chancellery of every state in the world has had to take a stand in relation to this bipolarism, either by openly aligning itself with one pole or the other, or by trying to steer a nonaligned course. "Nonalignment" has as a matter of fact shown itself to be objectively more or less "aligned." Diplomacy executes itself in constant painful consciousness of the simultaneous pulls of the United States and the Soviet Union upon itself. Since this pull is not only one of power but of ideology, namely, of man's ultimate interpretation of himself and the world, it is most fateful indeed. Writers have been talking of a breakdown of this bipolarism either by some rapprochement between the two poles or by its replacement by multipolarism, with China. Western Europe. Japan, and "the third world" added. The truth is that these are only modifications of a continuing bipolarism that appears to resist all annulment.

3. The third great fact determinant of present-day diplomacy is the rise of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. "Rise" here means that these peoples have taken their destinies in their own hands. One speaks of Asian, African, and Middle Eastern nationalism. or of the emergent or newly independent or developing nations. This new fact affects diplomacy in four ways:

a. The 80-odd new sovereignties have all established their own foreign ministries, improvised their own diplomatic service. sent and received ambassadors, and joined the United Nations. This is a revolution in the composition of the diplomatic corps everywhere. Neither they nor the rest of the world have yet adjusted to the new situation. For instance, some representatives of the new nations at the United Nations found it difficult after their entry to resist the temptation of preaching to the rest of the world on morality, justice, freedom. and human rights. Also they often club together not on objective grounds of common national interests, but for such divisive reasons as colour or race or sheer anticolonial sentiment. Diplomacy cannot function properly except on the basis of rational calculation based on real national interests.

b. The new nations (new only in the sense that they have only recently attained national independence. but some of them are, as nations, much older than the "old" nations) are all drawn into the field of competition of the great powers. no matter how much they may try to be neutral or nonaligned, because they need the great powers more than those powers need them; and so the diplomacy of both the great and the small is determined by this need and this competition.

c. The fundamental problem of the new nations is how to develop themselves–materially, economically, socially, politically, culturally–to be able to stand on their feet. and as they can only develop themselves with the help of the more developed, these have added in their diplomatic arsenal a whole plethora of agencies –economic, financial, educational, technical, administrative–attuned toward that end. This meant a proliferation of new departments in foreign ministries and of technical attaches in embassies abroad. New competitive dimensions have thus arisen, and this has at once complicated and enriched the diplomatic act. Development has become such a magic concept in contemporary diplomacy that Pope Paul VI has equated it with peace (encyclical *Populorum progressio*). One of the most important functions of the United Nations and the specialized agencies is to extend technical and economic assistance to the developing nations, and to that end they expend hundreds of millions of dollars annually.

d. With the need and the keen competition the qualities of patience. understanding, forbearance, depth, and wisdom. and the deepest sense of responsibility have never been more demanded of the diplomatic agent than today. The envoys of the new and inexperienced must foster extraordinary humility and patience, of course with proper dignity, and those of the great and established must realize that one word or gesture or one act of imprudence on their part could bring-about the downfall of a whole regime and could contribute to the doom of a whole culture.

4. The further fact that radically determines the diplomacy of the present is what Churchill called "the balance of terror." Nuclear weapons are piling up day after day, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Small nations may be allowed the luxury of fighting wars among themselves (there have been 40 or 50 such wars since the United Nations was founded) with or without the help of the great, but the nuclear powers must eschew any nuclear confrontation. This means that, short of a breakthrough in offensive or defensive weaponry wholly unknown or unmatched by the other side –and despite the emergence of China as a nuclear power this is still a bipolar matter between the Soviet Union and the United States–both sides have immobilized each other with respect to nuclear war; which in turn means that the war value of the atom and the nucleus is only to deter. It is customary now to hear insults hurled on the great powers by one another or by the small without anybody reacting. Similar insults led to wars in the past. The dimension of diplomatic patience, prudence, subtlety, resourcefulness and forbearance, whether in the great capitals. or at the United Nations. or in special conferences, is now opened out toward infinity; the diplomats will procrastinate no end, they will never break off negotiations, they will maintain permanent contact (the "hot line" between Washington and Moscow. for example, and between many other capitals now), they will devise endless general formulae (propositional functions), they will be infinitely flexible, rather than run the risk of a nuclear collision. The Austrian treaty and the termination of the Korean War were achieved through hundreds of sessions of negotiation extending for two or more years, and disarmament commissions and conferences bid fair to keep on arguing for a hundred years if necessary. Thus the atom and the

nucleus are the invisible though most potent factor in every high diplomatic calculation and conduct today, and all fundamental indecision in high places has for its ultimate root the fear of the atom and its nucleus. This fear compels the negotiators to compromise and agree, or at least to understand each other and "coexist," or at the very worst, when they disagree, not to break off relations.

5. The "balance of terror" has led to another important result that is a factor in the determination of present-day diplomacy. Because the nuclear powers are immobilized toward each other with respect to war, they have been emboldened to turn their attention to each other's internal affairs, and in meddling in them they will go as far as they can because they exclude the possibility that such meddling might lead to war or even to the breaking off of diplomatic relations. Domestic situations in all countries have become more or less Free-for-alls under the deterrent umbrella of the atom and the nucleus; to be sure, much more so in open societies and much less so in the closed. This is often referred to as "peaceful competition," and while it is certainly peaceful in the sense that it is going on without war, it can achieve as fateful results as those attained by any war. Because man's infatuation with war over the millennia has led at last to the weapons of war abolishing war itself, the fundamental question today is, who is going to inherit the future, not by resorting to war but under conditions of peace: who is better fit, under the keenest of competitions, to win and survive, by and in peace rather than through war. The fearless interference in each other's internal affairs takes place today through propaganda, subversive activity–moral, intellectual, and even physical–fomenting discontent and revolution, utilizing front organizations or united fronts, cultivating political parties sympathetic to one side or subject to its command, seeing to it that ministers friendly to one side are in key positions, inspiring and supporting guerrilla warfare, whether rural or urban, and through all kinds of threats, inducements and gentle pressures. With the external iront muzzled so far as war is concerned, it is the internal front in all its dimensions that is now the principal battlefield. Two new species of diplomacy are therefore arising–how to fight subversion and interference descending from outside, and how to develop cohesion between the government and the people and their institutions in the face of this subversion. Whole new qualifications must be fostered in the "diplomatic agents" needed for these two tasks. It is obvious that under these conditions there is no letup in the applicability of the principles of Machiavelli, Whether inside the small nations where the great are in open competition with one another, or inside the domains of the great themselves, power politics and power diplomacy, much to the dismay of the idealists, are experiencing today a keen revival under the protective cover of the atom. The word tension means a heightened phase in power politics. Virtually everything Machiavelli spoke of, and much more, is attempted and the phrase "relaxation of tensions" means either a division of the spoils or the retreat of one side in the face of the other.

6. The sixth new fact affecting diplomacy is the United Nations and the proliferation of

international organizations. These have not replaced old-fashioned bilateral diplomacy, nor indeed can they. There is not a single diplomatic negotiation conducted just “by conference.” The proper function of the united” ‘ations is not diplomacy but conference with a view to elucidating and facilitating diplomacy (indeed how can it replace the old diplomacy when its Charter explicitly guarantees the sovereign equality of its members and forbids it from interfering in their free bilateral and regional relations with one another?). With respect to the items on its agenda, diplomacy and conference are actually carried out at the same time both among the delegations and wholly independently among the capitals. Considering these points, no master diplomat of the classical school need be disturbed at all. He may not feel at home at the united” -ations, but that only means that he should decline being appointed to represent his country in its councils. An exposure to how every nation in the world, in its freedom and sovereignty, feels and thinks and argues and behaves, in the critical presence of every other nation, should prove instructive and salutary, however.

United Nations conference and debate, despite all its showmanship and extravaganza and, at times, irresponsibility, has been most helpful to diplomacy. It enables responsible ministers in its great debates to reveal before the whole world and subject to the world’s scrutiny the fundamental lines of their foreign policy; it confronts the great with one another before the whole world; it enables the small to bring up their grievances and complaints before the judgment of the world, and often constructive decisions are taken. The mere airing of a complaint at times defuses the tension and removes, at least for the time being, the threat to peace. Virtually all the new nations have received their diplomatic schooling in the halls of the United Nations, and many of their leaders were United Nations veterans; on a score of situations–in the Far East, in the Middle East, in Asia, in Africa–United Nations conference has made a real impact; together with the specialized agencies, the United Nations has made enormous, if quiet, contributions in technical, developmental, and human rights matters; delegates to it and to other international organizations have formed lifelong friendships which proved most useful to diplomacy later on; its secretariat constitutes an excellent cadre of international civil servants; and its publications in a variety of technical fields are useful for scholar and diplomat alike. Modest and limited as it is, the United Nations enters into the calculation of every statesman and diplomat today, both as to the jurisprudence it has evolved, as to the uses it may be put to, and as to whether his country as a result of some action may be brought one day .to trial before the tribunal of the world.

Both the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and the Vienna Convention for Consular Relations of 1963 have been cited as instruments in international law that critically bear on contemporary diplomacy with respect to the structure, rights, and procedural regulations of diplomatic and consular missions. Mention must also be made of the Vienna Convention of

1969 on the Law of Treaties (the Treaty on Treaties), which has been described as setting forth "the code of rules that will govern the indispensable element in the conduct of foreign affairs, the mechanism without which international intercourse could not exist, much less function."

The Future of Diplomacy.–The future of diplomacy is clearly the future of the nation-state system in a world of antagonistic superpowers. Diplomacy means negotiation and accommodation between independent-and sovereign states with a view to the continuance of their existence and the enhancement of their interests. Given a community of free and independent states, and given the presupposition of their continuance, diplomacy is the exact word that defines the order of relationships that subsists among them.

Diplomatic experience throughout the ages leads to the reflection that a core of truth exists, drawn from the nature of things, that concerns the functions and norms of diplomacy, the character of the good diplomat, and the necessity for ritual, protocol, and diplomatic language. A simple insight is that diplomacy is essentially limited in its possibilities and promise by reason of the extradiplomatic dimensions of human nature, which is heir to a multitude of dark passions and humours, themselves grounded in its inalienable and mysterious freedom. This core of truth is lasting, and it will apply a thousand years from now as it always applied in the past and as it applies today. Although there is no substitute for the wisdom and depth which only direct personal experience. perfected by courage and suffering, can provide, it will always be the case that the best culture for the statesman and the diplomat is to ponder the great statesmen and historians from Thucydides to Churchill, and the best training for the technicians to meditate on the master technicians from Machiavelli and de Callieres to Nicolson.

But it is another thing with the nation-state itself, the unit of diplomatic action. The character of the diplomatic act is eternal; the rational aims between which the act takes place are not. The question should be asked, what is the future of sovereignty and independence–how far is sovereignty a fiction and how far a reality, how far national independence a truth and how far a myth? National sovereignty is essentially limited and it is breaking down. With the proliferation of "independent nations" there is a concomitant contraction in their independence. There are five basic reasons for this limitation and breakdown, some of which are likely to deepen in the future. (1) Requirements of security: no nation, not even the superpowers, can under modern conditions ensure its own security all by itself; whence arise defensive pacts, such as NATO, the Warsaw Pact, or other regional arrangements. (2) Economic interdependence: nations need one another economically, and so economic agreements are entered into between them, such as the European Economic Community and the special arrangements between the Communist countries. (3) Ideology: the Communist countries subordinate their sovereignties in the interest of their common ideology, and the non-Communist countries, especially those of the West, enter into voluntary agreements among themselves limiting their several sovereignties in the defense of their own fundamental values and interests. (4) Cultural insufficiency: in science and technology, in ideas of political and economic organization, and in other cultural matters, nations, especially the recently emergent ones, soon realize how much they depend on others, chiefly on the more advanced, and so no nationstate can determine its policy independently from cultural influences that critically penetrate it from the outside. (5) Cultural affinities: in many instances the Latin Americans move internationally more or less as a group; so do the Arabs; so do Muslim nations in relation to matters affecting their religion; the less developed countries at all sorts of conferences speak on many matters with one voice; racial or colour affinities create potent political bonds.

For these reasons internationalism, in the sense of strict legalistic relations between nations, is breaking down in favour of interculturalism, that is, relations between peoples not on the basis of the nation-state but on that of groupings of peoples into common cultures and civilizations, as well as in favour of new ideological alignments cutting across nations, peoples, cultures, and civilizations. It is thus totally false to treat any nation today as so sovereign and independent that it determines its position vis-a-vis the world monadically by itself. On top of the restrictions imposed by international law, including the terms of the United Nations Charter, every nation takes into critical account in the formation of jots foreign policy its obligations under the treaties to which it adheres, its needs and requirements in relation to those nations which can assist in providing them, whether on the basis of treaties or of *ad hoc* arrangements, its relationship to the Communist bloc (namely, whether part of it, or part of an opposing bloc, or part of the so-called Third World), and the underlying ties that bind it, whether or not juridically, to nations with close cultural affinities to itself. No sovereign has disregarded any of these calculations by the time he proclaims his policy, and they are all fully taken for granted by his ambassador abroad.

The ultimate unit in international relations is not the nationstate but culture (including ideology) and civilization. The nation is relatively fleeting but culture and civilization are far more enduring. The world of men, so far as actual efficacy in the international arena is concerned, is made up not of so-called nations, but of six or seven fundamental cultures. The fate of the world is the fate of these six or seven fundamental cultures and not that of the nations. Some nations could merge and others could split up without much affecting the history of the world. Nobody can tell whether 100 years from now we shall have 200 nations or only 50 or 20. Who knows whether the operating centrifugal forces in China, India, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Yugoslavia, Canada, the United States, and other nations will not cause these complex political agglomerations to break up into a number of subsidiary sovereignties? Or whether sufficient centripetal forces may not develop among the Latin Americans, the Arabs, the Africans, and other groups with underlying affinities. to cause them to coalesce into larger sovereignties? Or whether certain blocs, such as the Western and Soviet blocs, may not so evolve in political cohesiveness as to bring about further attrition in the exercise of sovereignty by the individual members?

The existence or non-existence of this or that nation-state is not the theme of history, except when that state happens to carry the principal burden of a great heritage. When whole cultures are beleaguered and undermined and in danger of disintegration, something much more serious is at stake. For Christianity to disintegrate and disappear, or for Islam or Communism or the Chinese or Indian outlook on life to disintegrate and disappear, is a worldshaking historic event–and not for this or that Christian or Islamic or Communist state, or even for the present Chinese or Indian state, to disintegrate and disappear. To understand what great diplomacy and statesmanship are really all about, one must first go deeply into the human spirit and the half a dozen fundamental outlooks on existence into which it articulates itself at present.

Allowing for borderline cases and for all sorts of possible gradations and overlappings among them, there are in fact six cultural worlds: Western Europe and its offshoots in the Western Hemisphere and throughout the English-speaking world; the Slavic world; the Islamic world; the Hindu world; the Chinese world; . and the African world. And again allowing for gradations, overlappings, and ambiguous cases, these worlds differentiate themselves culturally from one another by their differing fundamental conceptions of the nature of man (freedom, human person), mind, truth, art, morality, family (woman), society (justice, freedom), state, economic process, history (time), and differing views on nature and on God or the supreme being, whatever it be.

The policy to be formulated or represented or executed or negotiated is an expression of fundamental culture and outlook, or at least a means for preserving and deepening a given fundamental culture and outlook. That is what the sovereign, whether or not he knows it, is trying in the end to safeguard and enhance. He is a superficial ambassador who does not clearly see that in the instructions he receives he is in fact entrusted with much more than the interests of his own nation, narrowly conceived. He is a good ambassador who, while correctly playing the game of diplomacy according to the strictest rules, keeps in mind all the time a whole order of intangible considerations neither included nor even hinted at in his instructions. What confers meaning and zest on the diplomatic act, and lifts it from. a mere mechanical discharge of instructions, is the knowledge that one is serving a much greater cause than the mere interests of one's government or country or nation or sovereign–he is an instrument for the protection and promotion of the ultimate values of his own people, values about man and truth and freedom and destiny in which he passionately believes. And these always transcend any narrow national boundaries.

The six ultimate units of which the world of men is composed cling each to a system of values of its own and each wishes to preserve and defend it. The fate of the world is the fate of these six outlooks on being. The subsidiary parts of these worlds, no matter how "sovereign, free, and independent," are not really free to dispose of these values in any way they please. England or France or the United States is not really free to repudiate the fundamental values of Western civilization: the rest of that civilization will call it to account and bring it back to the fold. This is what happened to Germany under Hitler–it was brought back to the fold. Neither is a Muslim nation really free to do violence to the fundamental values of Islam. The solidarity of the Slavs was there as the natural expression of an underlying cultural affinity long before the proclamation of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Chinese world will cohere back together despite its impregnation by Buddhism across the Himalayas or by Islam from the Middle East or by Americanism across the Atlantic or recently by Marxism across the steppes of Siberia. So will the great Hindu world despite its tolerant openness to outside influences. Alone the African world displays a heterogeneity that cannot be easily compassed, but even here there are values, diffuse and desultory, that are not easily assimilable to any of the other worlds.

So long as these worlds were relatively isolated from each other they could afford the luxury of internal civil wars among their components. Thus while China was far away and the United States was fearful of any external entanglements, Europe could for centuries indulge in its intestine squabbles. The spatial-sociological contraction of the earth to a community has forced these worlds to look each after its own corporate physical and spiritual integrity. As a result, diplomats are keenly conscious of their responsibilities not only to their respective countries but to the larger cultural groupings to which their countries belong. And this is going to be increasingly determinant of diplomacy in the future.

The atom and the nucleus have also revolutionized the conception of diplomacy. The future of diplomacy depends on whether the statesman and diplomat can live under five new imperatives. (1) Nuclear war is unthinkable. (2) Everything must be done to dispel suspicion and nurture international trust and security, even in the face of radical contradiction. This means the maintenance of contacts and the fostering of cooperation at every possible level. (3) One must have enough faith in the values of one's civilization to be absolutely sure that they do not need war to flourish, but they can exist and deepen under the mutual deterrence of the atom. Systems of values can no longer prove their superiority by war even if ever they did so in the past; the competition between them can only take place from now on under conditions of peace. (4) The peace of the balance of terror is negative and unreliable; it is based on fear, and fear calls forth irrational reactions, kills all joy and all creativity, and therefore poisons all peace. It must give way to positive peace based on mutual trust. This means disarmament, for disarmament begets trust and trust disarmament. As never before, statesmanship and diplomacy must act under

the imperative of pushing the quest for disarmament with maximum and unrelenting vigour.
(5) A personal transformation in the mind and ethos and spirit is now demanded from every statesman and diplomat. Since the new weapons carry with them the possibility of destroying all mankind and all life on this planet, diplomats and statesmen are responsible not only for the survival and welfare of their nations and cultures but for averting this apocalyptic doom. What is at stake is not only their nation and their civilization, but the very existence of man and life on earth. The phrase “world citizen” is no longer the empty, sentimental, idealistic term it used to be–it has now a specific material content and an imperative necessity. The energetic cultivation of this personal sense of world citizenship and human solidarity should be the responsible task of political education by all national governments and in schools and universities all over the world. The deterrent importance of the atom and nucleus short of mutual foolproof disarmament is not touched by these imperatives.

The ultimate problem of peace. and therefore of diplomacy as the process of safeguarding and strengthening peace. is the twofold question, whether a universal order of genuine pluralism in a physically and intellectually contracted world is possible, and whether the components of this pluralism will close themselves up into monadic solitude or freely open themselves to active interaction with one another in the spirit of genuine mutual respect. Change and modification then will be free and natural, and the end can only be dynamic peace. It appears, therefore, that everything in the end depends upon conviction, respect, freedom, and nature meant here is the undistorted and uncontorted nature of man. Without conviction, there is no determination to seek and maintain peace; without faith in some ultimate positive values which peace will subserve, why not perpetual war, why not perpetual revolution, why not even annihilation? Without respect on a mutual basis, there can be no harmony among the many. Without freedom, there is no openness to the world, and either suspicion and fear will prevail, or security can only be attained by conquering and dominating “the other.” And a deformed and denatured man can only move from one instability to another. And as conviction, respect, freedom, and nature cannot be conjured up at will, but are original boons, the future of diplomacy, just as its past, will be essentially limited at every turn by whether mankind will be actually favoured with these priceless gifts.

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